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History and Social Progress
Reflections on Mead’s Approach to History
Daniel R. Huebner
AUTHOR'S NOTE
Portions of this paper were first presented at a conference on “Pragmatism and
Sociology” at the University of Chicago, August 2015. I wish to thank the organizers and
participants of that conference for fruitful discussions that have benefited the present
paper.
1 George Herbert Mead is familiar to many sociologists and social psychologists for his
theory of the social genesis and development of the self, but he almost never features in
discussions  of  history  or  the  philosophy  of  history.  Yet  Mead  took  the  problems  of
conceptualizing and studying history seriously and consistently wrote with problems of
history in mind. In this paper, I seek to demonstrate not only that George Mead wrote
substantively on historical issues, but also that his long-ignored conceptualization has
wide-reaching implications for how we study history.  The key lies  in identifying the
connections between his understanding of the nature of the past and how to understand
it, on the one hand, and his broader social philosophy, on the other. The paper is not
intended as a comprehensive restatement of Mead’s work on history, but is rather an
attempt to explore some of the possibilities that Mead’s approach opens in light of the
other aspects of Mead’s philosophy and in response to possible criticisms. I hope to show
that the implications of Mead’s approach warrant greater scrutiny, not just from those
interested  in  Mead  or  classical  American  pragmatism,  but  from  researchers  in  any
disciplines that employ historical research, because Mead’s work explores the nature of
the relationship between history and social progress.
The paper begins with a discussion of the major sources for Mead’s understanding of
history and temporality and a review of literature that has interpreted and built upon
Mead’s work on history, which I hope will be useful to scholars who find Mead’s approach
worth  pursuing.  Special  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  productivity  of  social  scientific
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interpretations of  Mead’s philosophy as a unique theory of  action and on the recent
renewed focus on Mead’s approach to history. This review provides an overview of the
major features of Mead’s approach as they have typically been understood and provides
orientation for the proposals made in later sections. 
Following this review, I consider potential criticisms or shortcomings of Mead’s approach
– as overly presentist or historicist – and show how recourse to other aspects of Mead’s
philosophy may address  such criticisms.  In particular,  I  draw upon his  dynamic and
semiotic theory of social action, his view of the relationship between democratic social
practices and forms of knowledge, and his theory of social self-consciousness. Such an
examination opens suggestive avenues for philosophers of history and for historians that
demonstrate the novel impact Mead’s approach may have on historical investigations. In
considering criticisms of Mead’s presentist focus – that the past is always discovered in
the present – I  show that Mead provides a novel  grounding of  our understanding of
history in ongoing social processes, and in considering criticisms of Mead’s historicism –
that knowledge, while claiming to be universal, is always a product of its time – I propose
that  Mead’s  approach  seeks  to  develop  better  historical  knowledge  through  more
participatory, democratically inclusive social practice. The paper concludes by seeking to
synthesize Mead’s social and dynamic approach to historical inquiry around the notion of
“responsibility”  by  proposing  that,  in  Mead’s  view,  historians  have  a  profound
responsibility to social reconstruction and progress.
 
Reconstructing and Interpreting Mead on History
2 Mead’s major philosophical discussions of history and the nature of temporality may be
found partly in a variety of works published during his lifetime (esp. Mead 1930, 1929a,
1929c, 1908, 1899; and Rigney & Lundy 2015), and partly in posthumously published works
constructed from students’ and stenographers’ notes and Mead’s manuscripts (esp. Mead
1938, 1936, 1932). Perhaps because of the near monopoly of the posthumously published
Mind,  Self,  and  Society (Mead  2015)  in  most  discussions  of  Mead’s  philosophy,  the
remarkable breadth and depth of Mead’s reflections on history in works such as The
Philosophy of the Present (1932), Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936), and
“The Nature of the Past” (1929a) have largely remained in obscurity (Huebner 2014: 191;
and Camic 2016).  Along with these major sources,  remarks about historical  events or
about the nature of history appear throughout Mead’s other published works, sometimes
in surprising contexts, and seem to indicate the ubiquitous importance Mead placed on
such problems of history in his philosophy. The dozens of extant student notes from his
courses that remain unpublished (see Huebner 2014 for complete listing) rarely fail to
discuss historical transformations in social consciousness. Indeed, Mead’s first academic
position was  as  an  instructor  at  the  University  of  Michigan teaching  courses  in  the
history of philosophy alongside courses in physiological psychology, and he continued to
teaching and write on historical topics his entire career.
3 A major problem confronting those who would seek to reconstruct Mead’s  theory of
history across his entire oeuvre is that much of the relevant material is not found in self-
contained, tightly-argued published articles, but rather in disparate remarks as recorded
by  students  or  in  manuscript  fragments  of  variable  incompleteness.  This  fact  likely
indicates that Mead repeatedly returned to these problems of history throughout his
career  and was  perhaps  even repeatedly  unsatisfied  with their  solution.  This  should
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probably caution us against a strictly held literalism and finality with regard to Mead’s
theory. I suggest throughout the following paper that the most productive course may be
to focus on the kinds of approaches Mead’s broader philosophy offers as the starting
point for our own inquiry rather than attempting to find the final answer on historical
topics.
4 Although Mead’s work on the nature of history has never been a central aspect of the
literature commenting on his philosophy, there have been disparate analyses of his work
on history and temporality that may be found in the social sciences and social theory
(Bergmann 1981; Bourgeois & Rosenthal 1990; Bourgeois & Rosenthal 1993; Flaherty &
Fine 2001; Frings 1983; Joas 1985: Ch. 8; Maines, Sugrue, & Katovich 1983; Moore 1936;
Nowotny 1992; Strauss 1991; and Tillman 1970), and in the literatures on metaphysics, the
philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy (Brogaard 1999; Cook 1979; Eames
1973; Fen 1951; Leahy 1953; Lee 1963; Miller 1943, 1973: Ch. 11; Murphy 1932; Natanson
1953;  Stone  2013;  Tonness  1933;  and  Ushenko  1934).  Despite  the  diversity  of  these
literatures, a few core themes that are important to subsequent discussions in this paper
may  be  identified:  (1)  nature,  itself,  is  temporal;  (2)  human  consciousness  emerges
through  temporal  social  processes;  (3)  and  science  emerges  in  history  as  the  most
reflective form of  human consciousness.  First,  natural  reality must  be understood as
profoundly  processual  and  temporal  rather  than  static.  Mead  was  in  dialogue  with
philosophers  of  science,  physicists,  mathematicians,  and  others  in  attempting  to
formulate an understanding of reality that was necessarily relational and perspectival,
and in which those elements of reality did not always already exist, but rather continually
emerged. He was strongly influenced early in his career by evolutionary theories and
later in his career by work in relativity theory and by the process philosophies of Alfred
North  Whitehead  and  Henri  Bergson.  Second  and  concomitantly,  Mead  argued  that
human social transformations are intrinsic to how we understand natural reality. Much
of his work is directed toward examining how the cognizing subject – the “self” – only
emerges through the course of historical social processes, and that it is therefore not
independent  of  history.  In  Mead’s  view,  one of  the forms of  self-reflection in which
humans engage is seeking to understand historical events. The development of such self-
reflective capacities happens in both phylogenetic (the development of human species
characteristics) and ontogenetic (the development of the individual’s self consciousness)
timeframes. Third, scientific inquiry – understood by Mead (1917a) as the social process
of working to incorporate new experiences of observers into a continually reformulated
universalizing  perspective  –  emerges  as  the  most  self-reflective  form  of  social
consciousness in the modern era, and an inherent part of this process is inquiry into
historical  events.  It  may  be  noted  that  in  Mead’s  work,  and  consequently  in  the
interpretations made of that work, there is little effort to maintain a principled line of
demarcation between the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history – that is,
between  Mead’s  understanding  of  the  historical  movements  of  scientific  and
philosophical thought, on the one hand, and his theory of the role of history in human
social action, on the other hand. As the analysis below seeks to demonstrate, the way
thought unfolds in history is inseparable, in Mead’s view, from the way we understand
historical  development,  itself  –  and  both  must  be  understood  in  terms  of  social
transformations, not the self-unfolding of ideas.
5 Although few scholars in the field of history proper have seriously engaged with Mead’s
ideas on history and temporality, there are a number of works in the historically-oriented
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social  sciences  that  have  sought  to  interpret  and apply  Mead’s  ideas  and for  whom
“pragmatism” means primarily the work of Mead and John Dewey. While I do not intend
to comprehensively review that literature here, it is worth pointing out that there are
some  general  points  consistently  attributed  to  Mead  and  other  pragmatists  in  such
historical-sociological  work.  The  pragmatists  are  considered  proponents  of  a  non-
teleological view of history in which emphasis is placed on: the formation and sequence
of events as problematic situations in the course of human social processes (Abbott 2001;
Schneiderhan  2011;  and  Wagner-Pacifici  2010);  the  importance  of  habits,  cultural
conventions, and institutions in shaping the course of history (Ansell 2011; Baldwin 1988;
Gross 2010, 2009); the self-reflective abilities of human actors to respond creatively, open
new possibilities of social action, and create through social action the very values toward
which action is directed (Baert 2005; and Joas 1996); the experiential ordering of temporal
events by means of narrative and symbols (Maines 1993; and Maines et al. 1983);  and
hence an overall view of society as a historically dynamic process of people “doing things
together” (Becker 1976;  and Blumer 1969).  They are affinities  between this  view and
recent forms of  cultural  or practical  institutionalism in historical  social  science (e.g.,
Adams,  Clemens,  & Orloff  1995),  and connections between pragmatism and the “new
institutionalist” analysis associated with organizational studies (Powell & DiMaggio 1991)
have also been noted (e.g., Scott 1995).
6 The  common  view  implicit  in  such  social  scientific  approaches  is  that  the  core  of
pragmatism is its unique theory of action.1 To my mind, the most convincing work to
explain this characterization is found in the work of Hans Joas (1996, 1985), who argues
that Mead’s theory of action centers the corporeal or embodied nature of human action,
the necessarily situational or contextual nature of intentionality, and the essentially social
nature of action, both onto- and phylo-genetically (see also Gross 2010 and Margolis 1986
for related discussions). Put another way, action is ultimately a process of human bodies
oriented  to  common practical  problems  that  develop  in  the  course  of  life  together.
Human mind or  thought  (in  all  its  connotations),  thus,  develops  within this  process
through  communication  that  is  bodily  or  gestural,  social  or  intersubjective,  and
situational or oriented to solving problems of real life. It is only the insistence of all of
these features that truly sets Mead’s pragmatism apart as a starting point for historical
inquiry, because such a theory offers a comprehensive conceptualization of action that
overcomes the problems of “residual categories,” a challenge raised but not adequately
solved  by  Talcott  Parsons  (1937).  By  developing  a  theory  that leaves  no  residual
categories – such as non-rational or non-normative action (Joas 1996: 4-5) – unexplained,
Mead provides an approach to human action applicable to events of all times and places –
not just those that are judged to be oriented toward appropriately rational ends or norms
– as well as individuals’ subjective understandings of their own actions. 
7 It  might also be noted parenthetically that framing a philosophy in terms of  human
action already implies history. On the one hand, a comprehensive theory of human action
must be able to conceptualize action not directly witnessed, including past actions – an
approach that I have elsewhere proposed is key to understanding the development of
certain concepts of social theory, such as Max Weber’s ideal types and W. I. Thomas’s
situational analysis (Huebner 2014: 13-5). And on the other hand, as R. G. Collingwood
(1999: 40; 1956: 9) famously noted, “historians think and always have thought that history
is about res gestae, deeds, human actions done in the past.” A comprehensive theory of
action must be adequate to the explanation of history, and history is ultimately the study
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of  action.2 The  further  implications  that  can be  derived from applying  a  pragmatist
theory of action to the problems of history are explored in subsequent sections of this
paper.
8 In the last few years, Mead’s understanding of history and temporality has also been the
subject  of  renewed attention as  part  of  a  broader reevaluation of  Mead’s  philosophy
(Camic 2016; Campbell 2013; Côté 2013, 2015; Garcia Ruiz 2013; Joas 2016, 2013; Rigney &
Lundy 2015; Stone 2013; Thomas 2016; and Westbrook 2016). My own contribution to this
recent literature, upon which the present paper builds, has sought to demonstrate that
Mead consistently taught courses in the history of science and philosophy throughout his
career, that he wrote several major articles and participated in professional discussions
regarding  the  history  of  science,  that  among  the  Deweyan  pragmatists  Mead  was
considered the definitive expert on the history of thought,  and that Mead supported
efforts to institutionalize the history of science as a field of inquiry (Huebner 2016). In
general, I have sought to develop an analysis of Mead’s pragmatism both as a topic for
historical  reconstruction and as  a  subtle  perspective  from which to  engage in social
scientific study of knowledge – that is, to treat Mead as part-subject matter and part-
method (Huebner 2014). Hans Joas and I have also collaborated on projects to bring to
light new interpretations of Mead and his work (Joas & Huebner 2016; and Mead 2015). 
9 As a result of this renewed literature, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Mead was
the classical American pragmatist who worked most consistently and substantively on
the  problems  of  history.  Throughout  these  various  efforts,  Mead  appears  to  have
consistently argued that the history of thought depends on practical social changes and
that what counts as history is, itself, the result of changing ways in which the social order
becomes problematic in social consciousness. These findings echo some of the earliest
conclusions of Mead’s students and colleagues, that his method in approaching historical
investigations  was  to  identify  the  socio-historical  context  in  which  intellectual  or
philosophical  problems  arise  and  to  show  how  thinkers  of  the  time  handled  these
problems in context (Castell 1937; and Moore 1936). All of these leads in Mead’s work and
in the various interpretations that have been made of them are very suggestive and may
prove useful to historical investigators. In addition, however, I wish to propose that Mead
sketched  a  profoundly  social  and  dynamic  orientation  to  historical  explanation,  the
implications of which have not been fully recognized, and proposed an approach that
may  ground  the  possibility  for  progress  and  ethical  responsibility  in  historical
knowledge.  The  additional  orientation  that  may  be  gained  by  examining  the
interconnections between Mead’s understanding of history and the other aspects of his
philosophy underscores both why Mead’s approach may be viewed as a practically and
ethically productive framework for research,  and how his  approach avoids becoming
merely another flat, relational history.
 
Presentism and History as Social Problems
10 Mead was acutely aware of a fundamental challenge that his work faced in accounting for
history, and of the criticism that he (and John Dewey) received in this regard (Joas 2016;
Huebner 2016; and Joas 1993). In centering itself theoretically on action in the present,
pragmatism raises the challenge of relativism, both in the sense that one’s present claims
about the features of history seem to be merely constructed rather than revealing of
absolute truth,  and that regardless of  its  content one’s  own knowledge must also be
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historically grounded, so it can apparently be no more universally true than any other
knowledge. The first we might call, for sake of convenience, the problem of “presentism,”
and the second the problem of “historicism,” although these are intimately tied to one
another. 
11 Mead acknowledged the problem of presentism head-on in a number of his writings. Most
obviously,  he  explicitly  claimed  in  his  posthumously  published  Carus  Lectures,  The
Philosophy of the Present, that “reality exists in a present” (Mead 1932: 1). The past can only
take on significance in relation to a present, so the kind of features and events history has
is continually “reconstructed” from this reality of ongoing social process. The past is both
“irrevocable  and  revocable”  in  his  view,  with  an  emphasis  on  how  the  supposedly
irrevocable  “‘real’  past”  is  only  ever  encountered through the  present  within  which
discoveries emerge, so each new emergent-present makes for a “different past.” Far from
meaning “radical doubt” in historical fact, this means that we take the past for granted as
“given” except when the problems of the present prompt us to “rewrit[e] the past to
which we now look back” so as to be capable of bringing about a different “world that will
be” in the future (Mead 1932: 3-5). It is easy to see how the past is “revocable,” in Mead’s
dynamic view, but its “irrevocability” seems to refer to the “apparatus” of “documents,
oral testimony, and historical remains,” the “memory images and the evidences by which
we build up the past” that have a duration through time so that they form the given – but
not essentially permanent – background against which discoveries of new evidence of the
past, or reinterpretations of those durable apparatus, occur in the present (Mead 1932: 5,
29-30). 
12 History, in Mead’s view, must necessarily be an aspect of the process of society’s self-
knowledge, as every transformation of society that gives rise to problematic courses of
action necessarily transforms what we consider history. What is needed is not a recovery
of the past as it really was, but a reconstruction that enables us to “interpret what is
arising in the future that belongs to the present” (Mead 1932: 30). No past that can be
constructed can be “as adequate as the situation demands,” because the “implications of
the  present”  could  be  carried  further  than  they ever  practically  are  in  pursuit  of
constructing “a past truer to the present within which the implications of this past lie”
(Mead 1932: 31). Notice here that social reconstruction in the service of a better future
necessitates a rewriting of history, and the construction of history is simultaneously a
practical and ethical endeavor for the historian.
13 This problem of the ongoing-present remaking the past means, for Mead, that even the
very way in which historians formulate questions – to what features of reality and other
bodies of knowledge they turn as evidence and fact – is historically variable. Mead (1910)
argued,  for  example,  that  the  turn  away  from  political  history  toward  social  and
anthropological history – specifically,  the “New History” of American historian James
Harvey Robinson in the early twentieth century – was an indication that new “problems”
had become central  to  society.  In  Mead’s  analysis,  historians  seek  out  new kinds  of
analysis and accounts when a new “social consciousness” arises that faces new questions
of social function. 
14 Mead’s account, of course, raises important questions about how historians are affected
by changes in the general social consciousness (or what early sociologists of knowledge
following Karl Mannheim (1936) called the problem of “imputation” – how we validly
connect the trends of thought or consciousness to the actions of particular social groups
or individuals (e.g., Child 1941). Mead’s most direct answer to this question comes from
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his work on the history of modern scientists, where the individual investigator is made
the center of analysis (Mead 1917a), an analysis which builds upon his theory of the social
nature of the self. Individual investigators wrestle with problems that conduct presents
to them in the course of their social lives, meaning their work depends necessarily on
their understanding of the problems of previous work by themselves and others, as those
problems are interpreted from their own experience. The individual investigator – and in
this respect the historian is no different from the experimental biologist – as socialized in
“a  highly  organized  society,”  finds  problems  with  taken-for-granted  assumptions  or
practices in his or her own experience, and instead of solving the problems through the
adoption  of  a  new  “subjective  attitude”  about  them,  develops  a  new  “object”  of
experience that attempts to incorporate all previous experiences.
15 As I have suggested elsewhere (Huebner 2016: 50, 58), Mead’s explication of this process
of inquiry sought to demonstrate the superiority of such a pragmatist approach over so-
called realist approaches. The New- and Critical Realist philosophers of the time (Holt et
al. 1912;  and Drake et  al. 1920)  misunderstood the pragmatists by proposing that the
pragmatists’  conception  of  inquiry  was  a  subjective  process:  people  confronted  by
anomalies change their minds about some aspect of reality. Mead was a particular target of
realist  philosophers  of  history  Donald  C. Williams  (1934),  A.O . Lovejoy  (1939),  and
Maurice Mandelbaum (1948),  and of essayist  Elinor Castle Nef (1953:  417-8),  who was
Mead’s niece married to historian John U. Nef (Huebner 2016: 52-3). But the alternatives
posed by realistic  approaches  must  always  in some way assume an independent  real
reality that is unaffected by human action and yet knowable in better or worse ways by
humans. Mead’s solution proposes instead that the object of experience – a trace of a
historical event or an observation of a natural phenomenon – is actually reconstructed
into a different object by a social process of communication in which experiences with
the  object  by  particular  individuals  conflict  with  socially  taken-for-granted  ways  of
responding to the object (Mead 1917a). The experience of the socialized individual in the
present is absolutely essential to the very nature of reality (in any way that it can be
conceived) and hence the social process is continually necessary to the transformations of
that reality. This approach to inquiry is just as essential to historical investigation and
underscores Mead’s broad understanding of “science” to include all the ways in which
reflection on experience is capable of changing reality.3 
16 It would be easy to see in Mead a willing surrender to presentism; after all, what can we
say if even what counts as history fundamentally changes, and if even the authority of
individual  experience  is  variable  across  time?  In  order  to  answer  this  question
adequately, Mead’s broader theory of action is necessary. Historical investigators, Mead
seems to argue, in order to develop a self-reflective enterprise, must examine the kinds of
problems that confront them in the course of their action in ongoing social processes,
and in  reflecting  on other  times  and places  the  investigator  must  also  examine  the
collective  problems  of  those  times  and  places  as  they  appear  to  have  presented
themselves  in  those  times  and  places.  When  Mead  examined  historical  events,  he
reportedly  exemplified  this  theory,  because  his  discussions  did  not  attempt  a  “mere
reproduction” of a historical event but rather proposed a “selective reconstruction, for
present purposes and in the light of present problems” (Murphy 1936). And when Mead
made specific claims about history, he consistently found them in eminently practical
problems:  the  expansion  of  Ancient  Greek  commerce  in  Asia  Minor  was  key  to  the
development of speculative natural philosophy (Mead 1896) and the application of steam
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power to industry prompted the development of thermodynamic laws (Rigney & Lundy
2015), for example. 
17 This solution, because it is specifically and thoroughly social, may be more satisfactory in
historical  inquiry  for  much  the  same  reason  that  Mead  argued  we  may  prefer  a
thoroughly social theory of mind (Mead 2015: 223): because it is better able to ground its
own  (and  its  alternatives’)  presuppositions.  For  example,  an  “evolutionary”  (i.e.,
historical) theory of the state may be preferred to a “contract” theory, in Mead’s view,
because social-contract theories cannot explain the existence of minds and selves that
they must presuppose in explaining how such already-conscious individuals enter into
society. Evolutionary theories, however, which must only presuppose “the existence of
the  social  process  of  behavior,”  are  fully  able  to  ground this  seemingly  self-evident
presupposition  in  fundamental  biological  and  physiological  relations  consonant  with
evolutionary principles (Mead 2015: 223). More broadly, the implication seems to be that
the historical investigator should begin to build an argument by examining the practical,
objective features of the social process – discovering which features appear to be relevant
in context – and minimizing the assumption that actors of other times and places are (or
are not) essentially “like us” in their cognitive faculties or motivations. This is a problem
that has plagued many attempts to conceptualize historical action in terms of “rational”
and  “irrational”  or  “normative”  and  “non-normative”  elements  (see  Joas  1996  for
discussion).
18 What is clear throughout is that Mead provides a sophisticated and subtle approach to
the problem of  presentism –  of  historical  inquiry  always  occurring in  the  present  –
without simply dismissing the problem, and that Mead’s approach consistently addresses
this issue by rooting historical inquiry in social processes of action. We do not overcome
the problem in this way, if what that means is finding a way to recover the past “as it
really was,”  but  we find an approach that  conceptualizes the process of  inquiry and
provides a novel perspective on the investigation of historical events. Mead opens an
avenue by which we may ground history as social self-reflection, and when added to
additional insights developed below, may perhaps point toward better inquiry into past
events.
 
Historicism and the Grounds of Historical Knowledge
19 Mead also addressed the criticism of “historicism” – that our understandings of the past
are,  themselves,  located in historical  contexts,  and are thus no less  fundamentally  a
product of their time. Or stated another way: because our investigations and conclusions
about  the  past  are  no  less  fundamentally  directed  toward practical  problems  in  the
present, they cannot definitively claim to be faithful retellings of past events in their own
terms or universally true for all future inquiries into the “same” past events. What is
necessary,  then,  is  to  be  able  to  ground  the  possibility  of  better,  not  just  different,
knowledge  of  history.  Can  we  discern  a  criterion  for  progress  or  a  logic  for  more
encompassing knowledge in historical inquiry? 
20 There are at least two interconnected approaches in Mead’s philosophy to the problem of
seeking grounds for better knowledge: (1) in terms of democratic social practices, and (2)
in terms of the symbolic character of human social action. For a first approach to this
question, we can look to Mead’s explicit attempt to ground pragmatism historically, in a
paper given on the occasion of John Dewey’s seventieth birthday. For Mead, Dewey was
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the best exemplar of the principles of American pragmatism (more so than William James
or Josiah Royce, whom he also considers), and he grounded the analysis of this philosophy
in the “political habits” that ultimately derive from the pioneer New England settlers
(Mead 1930: 212; see also Mead 1935).4 The political arrangements and consciousness of
the settlers, which was centered on the “nexus of town meetings,” “grew out [of] the
solution of their problems” in “achieving” rather than “inheriting” a political and social
union.  Mead traced what  he  saw as  implications  of  this  basic  tendency through the
government,  business,  and  educational  institutions  of  the  country.  Mead  noted  that
pragmatism has faced “opprobrium” as the “philosophy of American practicality,” but it
is clear that he found a ground to prefer this philosophy over those that privilege a fixed
cultural ideal precisely because of its roots in democratic social practices (Mead 1930:
230-1). Cultural  historian  Eduard  Baumgarten,  in  particular,  found  Mead’s  essay
provocative in attempting to ground pragmatist philosophy in “town meetings” in which
the participants understood themselves to be “creating the community in the process of
acting together” as they confronted problematic situations (Baumgarten 1936: 83; 1938:
314).5 Baumgarten seemed to  consider  Mead’s  particular  contribution to  pragmatism
(over Dewey’s or James’s) to be this grounding of a philosophy that centers social action
in historical conditions of social action, themselves – a coherent, pragmatist grounding of
pragmatism.  So,  from Mead we  gain  a  sense  that  one  aspect  of  conceptualizing  the
historical  nature  of  knowledge  is  being  able  to  ground one’s  own knowledge  in  the
political  practices  from  which  they  emerge  –  that  is,  showing  how  one’s  mode  of
understanding  is  implicated  in  the  practices  by  which  the  political  community  is
constituted.
21 Mead’s  fundamental  neglect  to  acknowledge  pervasive  forms  of  exploitation  and
inequality over the course of  American history – including slavery and forced labor,
systematic violence against native people and dispossession of lands, social control and
disenfranchisement of women, and other forms – is striking, and should of course lead us
to temper the stark distinctions Mead makes between American, European, and other
political  contexts.  This  criticism can  be  pressed  further  by  acknowledgement  of  his
engagement with the American colonial settlements in Hawaii (Huebner 2014: Ch. 3), and
of the various points in Mead’s work in which forms of social domination are seemingly
intertwined with the gaining of knowledge. But at the same time, we may wish to avoid
the kind of reductionism that would explain Mead’s theory (and pragmatism in general)
as merely a class ideology (e.g., Herman 1944), and we should perhaps also acknowledge
the attempts by Mead to advocate on behalf of “radically democratic” social reforms (Joas
1985:  Ch. 2).  Other  major  attempts  to  ground  pragmatist  philosophy  in  particular
conditions  have  included  the  posthumously  published dissertation  of  C. Wright  Mills
(1966),  originally  entitled  “A  Sociological  Account  of  Pragmatism,”  which  sought  to
ground the philosophy primarily in the context of the development and expansion of the
modern independent research university in the late nineteenth century, and the work of
Cornel West (1989), who emphasized the importance of American bourgeois intellectuals’
experience of  liberation from past  constraints  while  also acknowledging the ways in
which those experiences were nevertheless  rooted in institutional  apparatuses which
reinforced  hierarchical  social  distance  from  ordinary  people.  West’s  work,  which
nevertheless neglects Mead, is perhaps the most sophisticated attempt to conceptualize
the  relationship  between  the  experience  of  freedom  and  agency  that  grounds
pragmatism’s  sense  of  the  importance  of  social  reconstruction  through  critical
intelligence, on the one hand, and the systematic inequalities that locate the possibility of
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such experiences only in particular social  strata,  on the other hand. The attempts at
historical-sociological  grounding,  while  extremely  valuable  in  many  respects,  are
necessary here only to show the profound willingness of Mead and other fellow travelers
to acknowledge the particular historical conditions in which the tendencies of their own
thought may be found; these works demonstrate – by its practitioners’ own admission –
that pragmatism is not rooted in an idyllic democracy. 
22 However, having sought to ground knowledge in historical social practices, we then need
an  approach  that  is  able  to  differentiate  forms  of  social  practice  in  terms  of  their
epistemological  value.  Can  Mead  support  a  claim  that  political  contexts  with  more
democratic  tendencies  (but  which are  not  idyllic  democracies)  are  superior  to  other
possible contexts in terms of the knowledge they produce? Later pragmatists including
Hilary Putnam, Cheryl Misak, and Richard Rorty have quarreled over whether pragmatist
epistemology implies a particular political stance or not (see Westbrook 2006 for review),
but  it  is  very  clear  that  Mead  saw  a  necessary  connection  between  democratic
inclusiveness  and  “smarter”  political  and  social  decision-making  (Joas  1985:  Ch.  9;
Carreira  da  Silva  2008).  Westbrook  (2016)  has  recently  argued  that Mead’s  (1923)
“Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences” gives a better “epistemological justification
for democracy” than even his friend and colleague, John Dewey, was able to mount. In
Mead’s view, as in Max Weber’s (1946), modern scientific inquiry cannot determine the
ends  toward  which  social  reconstruction  should  be  directed,  but  such  inquiry  can
formulate  those  ends  more  systematically  by  virtue  of  its  capacity  to  estimate  the
consequences of various pursuits. Mead takes this insight in a novel direction by arguing
that  democracy  is  a  necessary  condition  of  scientific  inquiry,  because  good  science
welcomes all interested inquirers to its deliberations. Thus, a society that hopes to deploy
the best scientific inquiry on behalf of its social reconstruction – what we might want to
call better knowledge – would thus have to have political institutions that seek to allow
any values and interests a seat at the table. Social inquiry, in order to be as successful as
possible, must be as inclusive as possible, but we are always faced with pressing demands
to  solve  the  problems  at  hand  that  cannot  await  the  realization  of  full  democratic
participation. So there is a continual tension between the practices of democracy in the
present  and  the  ideals  of  full  democratic  deliberation  that  would  provide  the  most
effective  knowledge  in  the  service  of  social  reconstruction  –  a  dynamic  in  which
democratic reform and social inquiry are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. There is,
in Mead’s work, a sense that the work to bring people to the table and to view oneself
from the perspective of others is always ongoing and practically accomplished wherever
people engage in cooperative social processes. 
23 In a recent work, Jean-François Côté (2015) argues that Mead took this line of argument
even further  by  providing  a  theory  of society  as  a  dynamic,  self-grounding  totality.
Drawing especially  from Mead’s  work on political  rights  and internationalism (Mead
1915a,  1915b;  1929b,  1936:  Ch. XVI),  he  proposes  that  Mead  sketched  the  historical
evolution of a form of society capable of being permanently self-conscious, not in the
sense that it becomes a metaphysical entity nor that it solves all social problems, but
rather one in which social action as a whole could be guided by continual anticipations of
practical consequences from participants in democratic politics. In this way, science and
democracy are again necessarily intertwined. The key, according to Côté’s reading, may
be found in the way that democratic societies institutionalize an engine of social self-
transformation  into  their  political  constitution.  In  Mead’s  (1915a:  141-2)  words,  the
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creation of representative democracy, itself, involves an “institutionalizing of revolution”
so that instead of permanently securing a fixed structure of government they secure “the
opportunity for continual change.” This, of course, does not mean that we should take
Mead to naively believe in the irreversible progress of democracies. As Joas (1985, 2016;
see also Deegan 2011) has argued, such faith was shattered, if for no other reason, by
World War I. 
24 Related to this claim that better knowledge may be grounded in more democratic social
practices, and in part explaining the mechanism by which this process may take place, is
Mead’s “semiotic” or communicative theory of human action, with its notion of universal
role-taking.  Joas  (2016,  2013),  especially,  has  been  concerned  with  the  problem  of
historicism and has worked to develop a synthesis of pragmatism and Ernst Troeltsch’s
“existential historicism” that is adequate to address such problems.6 Mead’s theory of
action is not capable of providing a final “absolute” or “ideal” end to historical inquiry,
but it may suggest a unique criterion for validity claims while still acknowledging the
radically temporal or historical nature of all human experience and, consequently, of all
human ideals. In Mead’s view, symbols extend far beyond their emergence and use in
particular  social  interactions  (as  they were implicitly  understood in much “Symbolic
Interactionist” sociology that claims to descend from Mead), because symbolic acts bear a
reference to a “universe of discourse” – a continually emerging social totality defined by
all those individuals who can understand the symbol in functionally identical terms and
for whom the symbol can become a reference point for action. Now, Herbert Blumer’s
(1969: 20, 60) classic statement of the theory and method of “Symbolic Interactionism”
does  acknowledge  the  historicity  of  each  new  social  situation  by  arguing  that  any
instance of “joint action” necessarily “emerges out of and is connected with a context of
previous joint action” and “cannot be understood apart from that context” or “historical
linkage.” However, much of Blumer’s work lacks a sense of anything fundamentally new
emerging in social life – new situations, new institutions, and new actions, surely emerge
in his view, but out of other situations, institutions, and actions – leading to a rather
flattened view of historical development. It is difficult in such work to find a theoretical
ground for the emergence of “international mindedness” out of national mindedness, of a
society capable of intelligent self-regulation out of a habitually-oriented society, or of
human  consciousness  emerging  through  historical  social  process,  all  problems  that
concerned Mead’s more dynamic, emergent view of historical change. And in this regard,
mainstream sociological  approaches  to  history  by  way  of  the  study  of  sequences  of
interactions or the development of institutions fare little better. Still, Blumer was closest
to  recovering  Mead’s  view when he  reflected  on  the  rise  of  industrialization,  social
movements, and scientific discoveries (esp. Blumer 1990; see also Blumer 1969: 23, 47).
25 Mead’s semiotic approach to action allows for the emergence of multiple and overlapping
universes of discourse and for collective symbolic actions, such as the acts of a social
institution. Take, as Côté (2015: 123) suggests, the example of the conferral of rights upon
some individual or group: such a performative act becomes a reference point for other
institutions and actors in other contexts, even those who would oppose them. Indeed, as
Mead (2015:  161-2,  199,  261,  267-8;  1936:  13-9,  21,  25-7) repeatedly argued, a right to
“property” is more than just “possession” precisely because of its symbolic character –
anyone who would claim it as a right must also recognize that claim as reciprocal when
made by others. This symbolic character of human action also allows it to transcend the
ongoing present (while still being rooted therein) in order to reflect on the past and to
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anticipate the future (Mead 2015: 350). And Mead (2015: 202-3, 281-9; 1929b) sought to
show how, when new relationships form that expand the social processes in which people
participate, symbolic communication becomes more universal in its reference, and that
fundamental  changes  in  the  nature  of  these  symbolic  referents  characterize  the
transitions from one historical period to another. 
26 In this view, the social importance of historical inquiry lies in the historian’s ability to
trace out  the developments  –  social  “changes,  forces  and interests”  –  that  were not
present in the conscious experience of the members of the community at the time (Mead
2015:  256).  The  life  of  the  whole  social  process  in  which  the  individual  is  involved
transcends the experience of the individual, and Mead argues that it is precisely the vital
work of historians to bring more of that process into focus. The unique vantage point of
the historian does not come merely from the abstract passage of time, but from processes
of “social reconstruction” that allow people to identify with one another in ways that
they had not previously (Mead 2015: 297). Human diversity is, thus, productive of social
progress when people who had not previously been brought in contact are incorporated
into cooperative acts together.7 Because such practical forms of social participation lead
people to become more self-conscious of the broader community life of which they are a
part, inclusive social processes also make for a more universal standpoint from which to
evaluate past events. 
27 Of course, everything still  remains to be done in order to turn this suggestion into a
practical guide for history. The specific paths by which inclusive social processes would
make for  better  knowledge,  how we can determine what  counts  as  “more inclusive”
arrangements in a practical sense, the origins of the human diversity that drives changes
in social perspectives, and other problems all remain open questions and lead us back
into  ongoing debates  in  contemporary  ethics,  politics,  and  philosophy.  Nevertheless,
connecting the lines of argumentation sketched in this section leads us to the suggestive
possibility that there is a ground for better historical knowledge in such a democratically
inclusive  and self-transformative  social  order,  because  in  rewriting  history  from the
standpoint of a more inclusive social process we find a claim to greater universality. This
approach preserves an understanding of the historicity of our knowledge about history
(as well as about other topics) while also suggesting how social change can be more or less
conducive to progress in our historical knowledge.
 
The Historian’s Social Responsibility
28 Perhaps one of the most unique contributions Mead can make to historical research and
thought, a contribution that helps bring together the practical implications of Mead’s
approach,  is  his  notion of  responsibility.  In  an early  review essay,  Mead (1897:  790)
already called responsibility “the most central of all the expressions of personality.” In
the view of Mead’s social philosophy, the personality is always developing through social
processes that change and enlarge our self-consciousness, and one of the key functions of
that self-consciousness is anticipatory control over one’s own responses to a situation.
This makes us responsible not only for our own conduct, but also for shaping the changes
in other individuals’ conduct involved in the same cooperative action (Mead 2015: 403).
Thus, there is an imperative sense in which to become a more fully conscious personality
or self is to accept the responsibility both to know one’s own attitudes and habits and to
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display or represent the action in which one is involved in a conscientious way that will
lead to successful cooperative processes, however success is situationally defined. 
29 From nearly the earliest reflections on his understanding of history, Mead’s students and
colleagues  made  the  case  that  his  historical  work  was  necessarily  intertwined  and
inextricable from his more well-known theory of the self (Moore 1936: xxvii-xxxvi; and
Murphy 1936), but this observation has rarely been developed. For the historian, Mead’s
approach means a self-conscious recognition of the collective and ongoing enterprise of
historical  inquiry in which people are involved together,  as  well as  a  socially-rooted
responsibility  to conduct  that  inquiry conscientiously.  Mead (2015:  175-8,  182-3,  203)
emphasized that, regardless of whether someone takes a stand in criticism or in support
of some particular situation, that response involves an acceptance of responsibility for
the  situation.  Taken  seriously,  this  responsibility  may  lead  us  to  conclude  that  the
conscientious approach to history is to conduct ourselves in such a way that we can both
locate our claims historically and take responsibility for the subsequent consequences of
our  claims  about  historical  events.  If  we  accept  Mead’s  approach to  the  problem of
“presentism,” we may conclude that conscientious historical inquiry means both crafting
claims that are open to – and expect – revision by the ongoing process of  historical
discovery (Huebner 2014: 218-20) and seeking out precisely the evidence and the social
perspectives that would provoke those revisions. Only if one truly accepts Mead’s radical
conclusion – that the history to which we look back, itself, changes as society changes,
and not that history is unaffected by our changing social perspectives on it – does the full
weight  of  the  historian’s  responsibility  really  become  apparent.  The  possibilities  of
historical investigation only develop in the course of history, not in the abstract, Idealist
sense of Mind’s self-unfolding, but in the sense of practical social developments providing
new perspectives on events, and hence a responsibility to shape those developments. And
if  we  accept  the  further  connections  sketched  between  knowledge  and  democratic
politics, we may further conclude that historical knowledge is better whenever it can be
shown to refer to – and be the result of – more inclusive social processes.
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NOTES
1. In the confines of this paper I am unable to fully articulate the possible tensions between two
views of the core of pragmatism: as either a theory of action or a theory of truth or knowledge
(let alone other possible interpretations).  These views are obviously complementary in many
respects, and the particular emphasis on one or the other depends largely on what use can be
made of the label “pragmatist” in different contexts. With regard to the classical pragmatists, it
may be worth noting that a clear articulation of pragmatism as a theory of action dates at least as
far  back as  Wilhelm Jerusalem’s  (1909:  554-5)  work to  develop a  “sociology  of  knowledge”  [
Erkennen]  in  which  he  claimed  that  pragmatism  was  ultimately  a  theory  of  “the  intimate
interrelation between theoretical thought and human organization invested in its very core with
activity, with  action.”  Of  course,  the  classical  American  pragmatists,  themselves,  made  this
argument (perhaps especially in the work of John Dewey from the 1890s onward), but Jerusalem
is  perhaps  the  first  scholar  who,  upon  encountering  the  work  of  American  pragmatism,
developed its theory further along the lines of a theory of action. Although many early critics
also focused on pragmatism as a theory of knowledge or truth, some others who appear to have
been  influenced  by  Jerusalem’s  reading,  such  as  Émile  Durkheim  (1983  [1913-14])  and  Max
Scheler (1926), focused instead on its approach to action (cf. Huebner 2013). In Durkheim’s (1983:
chaps. 13, 16) view, in particular, the ability to explain historical events is a critical test for a
coherent philosophy, and pragmatism’s apparent individualistic starting-point (he was thinking
mostly of James) failed to provide an account of historical action that was as adequate as his own
sociological theory.
2. Collingwood (1956) is, of course, known for his thesis that all history is the history of thought,
because in his view what interests historians in human actions is the rationality they express.
Although this approach is avowedly idealist, recent scholarship has sought to free Collingwood of
the charge that he over-rationalized the object of history by showing his expansive approach to
the nature of what counts as “reason” in action (van der Dussen 2015). Louis Mink (1969) was
among the earliest and most explicit in attempting to draw connections between pragmatist and
Collingwoodian  philosophies  of  history;  and  we  might  add  that  Collingwood’s  ideas  –  that
historical knowledge is the “reenactment” of historical events in the mind of the historian and
that ultimately the purpose of historical inquiry is general “human self-knowledge” – present
interesting connections that could be further developed between the two philosophies. Of course,
Collingwood is by no means the only theorist to conclude that history is essentially the study of
action,  and it  is  interesting to note that even the practical  literature on the management of
archives draws the same conclusions to support an understanding of how archival materials may
serve as documents of human social life (e.g., O’Toole & Cox 2006: 87-92).
3. It may also be noted that the very process of inquiry in which the individual’s experience is
central  to  advancing knowledge  of  reality  is,  itself,  the  result  of  the  individual  becoming  a
historical problem for society, according to Mead. This is a topic Mead apparently discussed in
his  lectures,  both  with  reference  to  how  the  individual  emerged  as  a  problem  for  social
consciousness  in  the  development  of  modern  nations  and  citizenship  and  with  reference  to
psychological and ethical theories, which were faced by problems of social control. For additional
discussion, see Huebner (2016: 44-5).
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4. In his posthumously published manuscript on “The Philosophy of John Dewey” (Mead 1935),
which was likely originally a preparatory essay for his talk on the occasion of John Dewey’s 70th
birthday  (Mead  1930),  Mead  discussed  American  philosophy  in  light  of  historian  Frederick
Jackson  Turner’s  “most  illuminating  conception,”  the  so-called  frontier  thesis,  arguing  that
pioneer settlers were forced by circumstances to justify their institutions by their usefulness and
the ability to serve more than one purpose rather than subjecting them to purely philosophical
criticism.  These  articles  also  have  two  more  autobiographical  counterparts  in  which  Mead
locates his own intellectual development in these same social contexts (see Mead 1917b; Cook
1992).
5. Eduard Baumgarten, who was a nephew of Max Weber, studied and lectured in the United
States  at  Columbia  University,  the  University  of  Chicago,  and  the  University  of  Wisconsin–
Madison, and had definitely met both Dewey and Mead in the late 1920s before returning to
Germany.  He  even  apparently  discussed  with  Mead  the  possibility  of  translating  Dewey’s
Experience and Nature into German (M. C. Otto to J. Dewey, 19 December 1928; Dewey [1997], no.
05085).  Joas  (1993:  110)  has  pointed  out  that  Baumgarten  was  the  “decisive  figure,”  the
“catalyst,”  in  “conveying  the  ideas  of  pragmatism  to  fascist  intellectuals,”  including  Arnold
Gehlen and Helmut Schelsky, in pre-World War II Germany. One can underscore this point by
noting that a few of these scholars referred to Mead’s “Royce, James, and Dewey” essay explicitly
on the basis of Baumgarten’s analysis (e.g., Effelberger 1936; Gehlen 1951). It appears that these
fascist theorists drew upon what Mead took to be an ethically positive claim – that pragmatist
philosophy was linked with particular American democratic practices – to criticize its general
philosophic importance and perhaps also to attempt to ground fascist theories of action.
6. Joas (2016) seems to argue that Mead’s “semiotic anthropology” is the correct direction for
historical knowledge, but finds that on several accounts Mead does not ultimately provide all the
tools  necessary  for  this  endeavor  –  for  which  we  must  look  especially  to  ideas  from  Ernst
Troeltsch and Josiah Royce. In particular, Mead does not ground the conditions for our ethos of
universalism, itself (i.e., why we find a moral necessity in seeking universal cognitive or ethical
claims),  he  does  not  provide  a  fully  elaborated  theory  of  narration  as  key  to  the  historical
research process, and he seems not to make an explicit and dedicated attempt to connect his
theory of universal role-taking with the development of ideals as a way of addressing his radical
temporality. Joseph Margolis (2006; 1986) is another major voice to have attempted to work out
such  a  synthesis  between  pragmatism  and  historicism.  Although  Margolis  (2002:  131)
acknowledges that Mead’s historical investigations have been “almost entirely neglected,” even
by John Dewey, he does not give any substantive discussion to Mead’s ideas and underestimates
the breadth and depth of Mead’s historical work, which he characterizes as “very limited.”
7. Historically important forms of this integration, according to Mead (2015: chaps. 36-7), have
included incorporation  in  economic  trade  and production  relationships  and in  universalistic
religions, although Mead was very aware of the need to differentiate between exploitative and
cooperative economic and religious arrangements.
ABSTRACTS
Although  not  known  as  a  philosopher  of  history,  George  Herbert  Mead  wrote  and  taught
seriously about the nature of the past and about historical investigation throughout his career.
The paper identifies the major documentary sources and interpretive literature with which to
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reconstruct Mead’s radically social and dynamic conceptualization of history and extends beyond
the  existing  literature  to  develop  striking  implications  of  Mead’s  approach  in  response  to
possible criticisms and challenges. By connecting Mead’s writings on history with his broader
social theory of action, democracy, and consciousness, the paper shows how Mead provides a
novel grounding of our understandings of history in ongoing social processes and suggests that
better historical knowledge may be related to participatory, inclusive social practices. As a result,
historians have a responsibility to social reconstruction and society’s self-reflection, in Mead’s
view. Because of the novel ways in which Mead’s approach explores the relationship between
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